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FORMING START-UP COMPANIES: WHO’S MY
CLIENT?
Nancy J. Moore*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: three individuals—a magician, a baker,
and a puppeteer—want to start a business that will run birthday parties for
children. The magician will put up most of the money, the baker has
extensive experience with children’s birthday parties, and the puppeteer, who
has an MBA, will manage the business. They meet with a lawyer to help
them form a company, including advising them on such issues as choice of
entity and allocation of ownership and control. Before the lawyer agrees to
the representation, she must ask herself: “who will I represent?”1
The author of this hypothetical, legal ethics expert Stephen Gillers,
suggests that the issue is whether conflicts of interest prevent the lawyer from
representing all three founders, in which case the lawyer would presumably
represent only one of them.2 Addressing a similar hypothetical, another legal
ethics expert, Paul Tremblay, agrees that the only plausible alternatives are
“represent[ing] the founders as joint clients, most often with an explicit
understanding that the firm would later represent any resulting business
entity” or “represent[ing] only one of the founders.”3 However, Tremblay
also suggests that, in some circumstances, the founders will already have
formed a partnership by operation of law, or a “default partnership.”4 In
these cases, the lawyer will likely represent the existing partnership entity in
choosing to form an entirely new entity.5 Tremblay also notes that under
“the rather quirky Jesse v. Danforth doctrine,” recognized in a few
jurisdictions, the founders, “while apparently individual joint clients during
* Professor of Law and Nancy E. Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law. This
Article was prepared for the Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 11, 2019, at Fordham University
School of Law. The author would like to thank Jim Wheaton and the participants in the
Colloquium for their helpful comments.
1. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS
214–15 (11th ed. 2018).
2. See id.
3. Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
267, 279 (2017).
4. Tremblay does not use this term; however, he discusses a partnership by operation of
law as governed by the default law of partnerships. See infra notes 159–63 and accompanying
text.
5. Tremblay, supra note 3, at 275, 304.
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the formation stage, retroactively convert to constituents of the entity—
instead of former clients of the firm—after the entity has been established.”6
Whatever that means. And, to offer yet another option, mentioned by neither
Gillers nor Tremblay, a State Bar of Arizona ethics opinion advises that a
lawyer may form a business entity for multiple founders “and be counsel only
for the yet-to-be-formed entity”—describing entity representation that is
prospective rather than retrospective.7 What’s a lawyer to do?
Most jurisdictions have not yet addressed the question of whether some
form of “entity” representation is available before a business entity has been
created. As a result, one of this Article’s goals is to explore the advantages
and disadvantages of doing so by considering both the “retroactive” and
“prospective” options. In my view, courts should reject both of these options
and insist on representation of one or more of the individual founders. But if
some form of entity representation is deemed desirable, then I argue that it is
the “prospective” rather than the “retroactive” option that should be
recognized. As for “default partnerships,” I agree that representation of the
existing entity appears to be at least a theoretical option, but I argue that such
representation may raise more problems than it solves. As a result, I urge
lawyers to choose to represent the partners jointly as individuals rather than
the default partnership entity.
Part I of this Article examines early views of client identity in forming a
start-up company. Although most courts and commentators assumed that
entity representation was impossible because the entity had not yet been
formed, one prominent commentator proposed reforming the ethics rules to
permit lawyers to represent an incipient entity—but only when it was
sufficiently “formed up” such that the group was the functional equivalent of
a legally recognized entity. Part II addresses the formal adoption of a
retroactive entity approach to preformation representation, including the lack
of persuasive precedent for such an approach, as well as the weakness of the
stated policy rationales. Part III discusses the concept of prospectively
representing a yet-to-be-formed entity, concluding that while this is more
attractive than a retroactive approach, it presents many of the same
difficulties. Part IV directly addresses the policy concerns in answering the
question of whether courts should permit lawyers to represent a yet-to-beformed entity. It concludes that the disadvantages of doing so outweigh any
benefits to the founders and that any such benefits can just as easily be
accomplished through joint representation of some or all of the founders.
Finally, Part V acknowledges that, under certain circumstances, founders
who have begun the process of developing a business become default
partners. When this happens, there is indeed an entity that qualifies for client
status; nevertheless, here, too, there are difficulties in determining both the
identification of the appropriate decision makers and the need to keep all the
partners informed. As a result, this Article concludes that the partners are

6. Id. at 299 (citing Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992)).
7. State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002).
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better off when the lawyer represents them individually in a joint
representation, where appropriate.
I. EARLY VIEWS ON CLIENT IDENTITY IN FORMING A START-UP COMPANY
The Wisconsin Supreme Court issued the “quirky” Jesse v. Danforth8
opinion in 1992. Before then, lawyers typically assumed that, when asked to
form a business entity, they could not represent the entity itself because, prior
to formation, the business “is only an incipient entity.”9 As a result, early
cases and commentators debated whether a lawyer could or should represent
more than one of the founders. For example, in a 1976 legal ethics forum
sponsored by the American Bar Association Journal, two legal commentators
debated the question of who the lawyer should represent in a hypothetical
involving three cousins who wanted the lawyer to form a corporation for their
proposed business venture.10 Richard Levin, the initial commentator, argued
in favor of representing the three cousins, while Meyer Myer, his opponent,
urged that, in all but the most exceptional case, the lawyer should advise the
cousins that he can represent only one of them.11 Similarly, in a 1985
Arizona Supreme Court decision, the question arose as to whether a lawyer
who formed a corporation represented two incorporators who subsequently
sued the lawyer for failing to disclose conflicts of interest involving a third
incorporator.12 To answer that question, the parties debated only whether the
lawyer represented all of the incorporators during the incorporation or
whether he represented the third alone and therefore owed no duty of loyalty
to the remaining two.13
And yet, even prior to Jesse, there were at least two commentators who
suggested that perhaps some form of entity rule could be applied to
representation in the preformation period. Scott Thomas FitzGibbon first
made this suggestion in a 1982 monograph published by the American Bar

8. 485 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1992).
9. See, e.g., BROOKE WUNNICKE, ETHICS COMPLIANCE FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 171
(1987). John Burman reached the same conclusion in 2003, well after Jesse was decided. See
John M. Burman, Ethical Considerations When Representing Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV.
581, 584–91 (2003). In discussing a 1995 Wyoming case involving a lawyer who had helped
two couples form a business together, Burman stated matter-of-factly: “[t]he lawyer cannot
represent the entity to be formed; it does not exist.” Id. at 589. The 1995 Wyoming Supreme
Court decision, which left it to the jury to decide whether the lawyer represented both couples
or only one of them, did not mention Jesse or the possibility of either a retroactive or
prospective representation of an entity-to-be. Id. at 589–90 (citing Meyer v. Mulligan, 889
P.2d 509 (Wyo. 1995)). Rather, the court noted: “[w]hen [the lawyer] was retained, [the
corporation] did not exist; instead, he was hired by both [couples] to create [the corporation],
as well as draft documents for the purchase of the motel.” Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509,
515 (Wyo. 1995).
10. See generally Stanley A. Kaplan, Legal Ethics Forum: Representation of Multiple
Clients, A.B.A. J., May 1976, at 648.
11. Id. at 651–52.
12. In re Ireland, 706 P.2d 352, 359 (Ariz. 1985) (rejecting the lawyer’s claim that he
represented only the third incorporator).
13. Id. at 356.
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Association (ABA).14 A 1987 ethics treatise for business lawyers supported
the general idea underlying FitzGibbon’s proposal, without mentioning any
of the specifics of that proposal.15 Before examining the proposal itself, we
should ask what motivated FitzGibbon to make it. What problem was he
attempting to solve?
The primary problem appears to have been the existence of conflicts of
interest among the individuals involved in forming the entity and the
difficulty of addressing these conflicts under the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”), which preceded the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”).16 Recognizing these
conflicts, the two practitioner-commentators in the 1976 legal ethics forum
disagreed about whether the lawyer should agree to joint representation of
multiple founders or only one of them.17 Myer, who opposed joint
representation, quoted extensively from disciplinary rule (“DR”) 5-105, the
Model Code’s conflict of interest rule, which prohibited a lawyer from
representing multiple clients with “differing interests” unless “it is obvious
that he can adequately represent the interest of each.”18 Myer then opined
that what
the code seems to require [is] that it must be clear to the lawyer beyond
reasonable doubt that he can represent the interests of each client with the
same degree of competence and loyalty as each client would be entitled to
if the lawyer represented him alone and that any reasonable doubt in the
lawyer’s mind should be resolved against multiple representation.19

Because such competence and loyalty appeared to require the lawyer to
attempt to maximize the financial interest of each founder at the expense of

14. SCOTT THOMAS FITZGIBBON, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF CORPORATE ARTICLES AND BY-LAWS 12
15. See WUNNICKE, supra note 9, at 174.

ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS,
(1982).

16. About the Model Rules, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/ [https://perma.cc/E9YBTQB3] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
17. See generally Kaplan, supra note 10.
18. Id. at 651. DR 5-105(A) provides:
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under
DR 5-105(C).
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). In turn,
DR 5-105(C) provides:
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple
clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if
each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf
of each.
Id. DR 5-105(C).
19. Kaplan, supra note 10, at 651.
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the others, Myer concluded that the founders’ interests clearly “differ[ed]”
and that the requirements of DR 5-105(C) could not be met.20
Arguing in favor of joint representation, Levin did not mention DR 5-105,
an omission obliquely noted by Myer.21 Rather, Levin quoted selectively
from an aspirational ethical consideration (“EC”):
[T]here are many instances in which a lawyer may properly serve multiple
clients having potentially differing interests in matters not involving
litigation. If the interests vary only slightly, it is generally likely that the
lawyer will not be subjected to an adverse influence and that he can retain
his independent judgment on behalf of each client; and if the interests
become differing, withdrawal is less likely to have a disruptive effect upon
the causes of his clients.22

Despite the obvious obstacles posed by this portion of EC 5-15, as well as
both the omitted portion23 and the disciplinary rule itself, Levin invoked EC
5-15 to emphasize the benefits of joint representation, which include saving
time and money and avoiding overemphasizing problems.24 He concluded

20. Id. That article’s three hypothetical founders differed in age, employment, family
obligations, and financial contribution. Id. at 648, 651. This resulted in significant differences
among them with respect to their need or preference for debt or preferred stock, the ease of
buying out a deceased shareholder, and need for present income as opposed to accumulated
earnings. Id. Myer dismissed the anticipated argument that these problems should be settled
by the founders without the lawyer’s help by concluding that this would make the lawyer “a
mere scrivener or draftsman” and that it would deprive “the client of a large part of the service
he rightfully expects.” Id. at 651. He similarly dismissed the argument that the lawyer could
“deal with these issues with fairness to all three clients,” concluding that this would make the
lawyer “an arbitrator or adjudicator, which not only is inconsistent with the traditional role of
the lawyer in the United States but by definition is proof of the existence of differing interests.”
Id.
21. Levin referred not to DR 5-105 but to EC 5-15. Id. at 650. Myer began his own
argument as follows:
While the ethical considerations of the Code . . . are aspirational in character and
represent the objectives toward which every lawyer should strive, the disciplinary
rules implementing them, as stated in the preamble to the code, are mandatory and
“state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action.”
Id. at 651.
22. Id. at 650 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15).
23. The omitted language includes the following:
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple clients
having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his
judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the
employment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the
representation.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15.
24. According to Levin, the most important reason to reject the conclusion that separate
lawyers are always required is “to avoid overemphasis on problems—that is, to reduce the
probability that, as many people think, ‘lawyers break deals.’” Kaplan, supra note 10, at 650.
He goes on to elaborate that “[t]he separate lawyers would properly see their function to
articulate and negotiate their clients’ divergent interests, generating counternegotiation and
giving force to the popular stereotype” of what it means to have multiple lawyers in an
amicable situation, noting that “[t]his doesn’t merely increase the fees, [but in fact] it has a
tendency to explode them.” Id.
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that “we cannot face the business world with an obdurate demand that every
situation must be handled by a multiplicity of lawyers.”25
Eight years later, FitzGibbon similarly concluded that a conflict of interest
is the major difficulty likely to be encountered by a lawyer who “sets to work
at the behest of a few individuals who normally intend to be among the
shareholders, directors, and officers”26 and that a “strict interpretation” of
conflict of interest provisions will often prohibit joint representation of
multiple clients.27 Like Levin, however, FitzGibbon argued that many entity
organizers “may have no real need for separate lawyers” and that, “[w]here
separate lawyers are not needed and not sought, it is better not to require them
because of the extra expense.”28 Further, “the introduction of opposing
counsel would likely give the whole matter an adversarial cast, to the
detriment of the planning and mediating side of the lawyer’s work.”29
Having identified conflicts of interest as the major ethical problem facing
lawyers forming an entity, FitzGibbon proposed not to relax the general
conflicts rule but rather to modify the specific provision governing lawyers
who represent entities like corporations.30 EC 5-18, using language similar
to current Rule 1.13(a) of the Model Rules, provided that “[a] lawyer
employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance
to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity.”31 According to
FitzGibbon, corporate personality may be a “fiction,” but it is a fiction taken
seriously, and the lawyer must take instruction in accordance with “whatever
its shareholders, directors, and officers have caused it to direct within their
powers and in compliance with the stipulated formalities.”32 Moreover, a
lawyer representing an entity “need not inform its constituents separately or
seek their instructions or consent even when acting to their disadvantage.”33
The rationale underlying this approach is that the constituents of a
corporation “have chosen to bind their fates together”—that is, “[t]heir

25. Id.
26. FITZGIBBON, supra note 14, at 2.
27. Id. at 4 (discussing DR 5-105). According to FitzGibbon, the founders’ interests are
likely to diverge according to the different roles they will assume: “[p]rovisions in the
corporate documents that serve the interests of the majority shareholder, for example, may
disserve those of the minority. Similarly, provisions that extend more leeway to management
correspondingly constrict those who are not part of management.” Id. at 2. FitzGibbon also
viewed the proposed Model Rule provisions as insufficient to support representation of
multiple clients in this situation, id. at 3, failing to anticipate the extent to which the Model
Rules have been liberally interpreted to allow the representation of conflicting interests in
many situations, including forming an organization. See infra Part IV.
28. FITZGIBBON, supra note 14, at 12.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 12–15.
31. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). Model Rule
1.13(a) provides: “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
32. FITZGIBBON, supra note 14, at 8.
33. Id. at 10.
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interests may differ but they have freely chosen to join them, and their
judgments that a mutual subordination of goals will benefit all is entitled to
respect.”34 Indeed, by “embrac[ing] documents such as articles of
incorporation and by-laws which establish who speaks for whom and when,
they have provided the lawyer with a means of knowing how to act for all of
them.”35
FitzGibbon readily conceded that neither the Model Code nor the proposed
Model Rules afforded any clear basis for taking a similar approach to a
corporation in the organizational stage.36 Nevertheless, he concluded that
many of the considerations that militate in favor of a “lawyer-for-the-entity”
approach in the case of existing entities also applied to a lawyer forming an
entity.37 As a result, he proposed the following:
Entity representation principles should be extended to some cases where
the “entity” is an informal one like that among promoters. Under
appropriate circumstances, such arrangements should be understood to fall
within the meaning of the phrase “a corporation or similar entity” in Ethical
Consideration 5-18. The circumstances are appropriate when the
individuals have “formed themselves up” with some degree of definiteness
into a unit which functions along agreed-upon lines. The individuals should
be eligible to be represented as an entity when they resemble partners under
a full written partnership agreement: when they have agreed to act as a unit
and to reach collective decisions.38

He then recommended the following amendment to then proposed Rule 1.13:
The term “organization” in Rule 1.13 includes an association which is
governed by articles of organization, by-laws, or a similar charter which
specifies a division of authority and establishes procedures for its exercise,
and which is entered into voluntarily by competent parties informed, or
having fair opportunity to become informed, as to the nature of the
association.39
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id.
39. Id. This proposal preceded the explosion of limited liability company (LLC) statutes
that began in 1992. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and
Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34
ECON. INQUIRY 464, 470 n.24 (2001) (pointing out that from 1992 through 1994, forty states
passed new LLC statutes). These statutes typically provide that founders may file the statemandated formation document with none of the substantive terms FitzGibbon proposes
because the statute supplies the default rules. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(13) &
cmt. 13 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) (explaining that an “operating agreement exists” when an
LLC is formed and, to the extent the agreement does not provide the “rules of the game,” the
statute “fills in the gaps”). If this is the case, then the filing manifests joint consent to do
business as a particular type of entity, but the founders will have provided this consent without
necessarily considering the nature of the entity they have agreed to form, including any default
rules governing such matters as the division of ownership and authority. My thanks to my
colleague Jim Wheaton, Director of the Boston University Startup Law Clinic and Research
Director of the ABA/Uniform Law Commission Joint Editorial Board on Uniform
Unincorporated Organization Acts, for this observation.
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FitzGibbon’s 1982 proposed Rule 1.13 reform was narrow in scope,
limited as it was to informal associations of founders that “resemble partners
under a full written partnership agreement,” and even then, it only applied
after the founders were informed of and agreed to a specific division of
authority and decision-making process.40 As for founders who are “not
sufficiently ‘formed-up’ to qualify for entity representation,” FitzGibbon
proposed that the ethical standards should be modified “to make it clear that
even joint representation which does involve material impact on the lawyer’s
loyalties is permissible where well-informed, sophisticated, and independent
parties consent.”41 In such instances of joint representation, FitzGibbon
urged lawyers to furnish a “representation letter” providing full disclosure of
the existence and implications of the joint representation.42
Model Rule 1.7(b) has been interpreted to adopt the second of
FitzGibbon’s reform proposals, permitting joint representation in many of
the situations involving multiple founders that would have been prohibited
under DR 5-105(C).43 As for his proposed reform of Model Rule 1.13, to my
knowledge, this specific proposal never received any serious consideration.
Five years later, Brooke Wunnicke, author of a 1987 ethics treatise for
business lawyers, appeared to endorse FitzGibbon’s general approach to
entity representation for a “group” of founders, but without FitzGibbon’s
explicit narrowing conditions.44 Rather, after noting that the existing entity
rules did not apply because “the corporation is only an incipient entity,”
Wunnicke concluded:
The appealing reality is that often the lawyer who is organizing a
corporation is representing the group. Hence, absent an actual conflict of
interest or patent unfairness to a member of the group, the same ethical
rules that apply to representing the corporate entity should apply to the
group who are the incorporators.45
40. FITZGIBBON, supra note 14, at 12.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 18–20.
43. Rule 2.2 of the 1983 Model Rules provided for the special role of a lawyer as an
“intermediary,” which involved “seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients
on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a
business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 2.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). That rule was deleted in 2002, at which time all
discussion of common representation was moved to the Rule 1.7 comment. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 32 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). The commission recommending these
changes stated that the reason underlying the initial adoption of Rule 2.2 was to permit
common representation in circumstances where it would have been previously prohibited, that
is, “when the circumstances were such that the potential benefits for the clients outweighed
the potential risks.” See Model Rule 2.2: Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, A.B.A. (Oct. 5,
2011), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000
_commission/e2k_rule22rem/ [https://perma.cc/YZ5A-MLRU]. Comment 28 to revised Rule
1.7 contains language almost identical to the initial Rule 2.2 comment. Compare MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 28 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
44. See generally WUNNICKE, supra note 9.
45. Id. at 171, 174. Wunnicke did not cite FitzGibbon (or any other source) for this
suggestion; however, she had previously cited the FitzGibbon monograph as criticizing the
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And eleven years after FitzGibbon first proposed treating a group of founders
as an entity in some limited circumstances, a Harvard Law Review note cited
both FitzGibbon and Wunnicke as support for the note’s endorsement of
Jesse v. Danforth,46 which had adopted an entirely different—and far
broader—type of entity representation in the organizational stage.
II. FORMAL ADOPTION OF A RETROACTIVE ENTITY APPROACH TO
PREFORMATION REPRESENTATION: JESSE V. DANFORTH AND HOPPER V.
FRANK
A. Jesse v. Danforth
In 1985, a group of twenty-three physicians retained a lawyer to assist
them in creating a corporate entity to purchase and operate an MRI
machine.47 One year later, the lawyer incorporated MRI Associates of
Greater Milwaukee (MRIGM) and continued to serve as its corporate
counsel.48 In 1987, MRIGM formed a service corporation and elected
subchapter S treatment, permitting the shareholders to be taxed as a
partnership but retain the benefits of a corporation.49 In 1988, two former
patients of two of the physicians sued them for malpractice arising from
allegations involving the use of a CAT scanner owned by a different
corporation of which the physicians were also shareholders.50 A partner of
the lawyer who formed and continued to represent MRIGM represented the
plaintiffs.51 The defendant physicians moved to disqualify the plaintiffs’
lawyer over a conflict of interest arising from the law firm’s current and
former representation of the individual physicians.52 The trial court denied
that motion, the court of appeals reversed, and the plaintiffs then appealed to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which reversed the court of appeals and
ordered plaintiffs’ counsel reinstated.53
In its opinion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on Rule 1.13 of the
Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct, identical in relevant aspects to the
Model Rule, for the well-settled positions that a lawyer who represents an
organization represents the organization itself and that, although the lawyer
may also represent one or more of its constituents, the lawyer does not

lawyer acting as an intermediary and urging lawyers to send detailed representation letters to
each organizer. Id. at 174. Wunnicke likely was referring to the proposal she must have seen
in the FitzGibbon monograph.
46. Note, An Expectations Approach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687, 703
nn.108–11 (1993). Although the note’s authors mistakenly cited both FitzGibbon and
Wunnicke as supporting a “retroactive” entity approach, elsewhere the note fully described
the “retroactive” approach first adopted in Jesse. See id. at 695–96.
47. Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Wis. 1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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automatically do so (collectively, the “entity rule”).54 Relying on a comment
to Rule 1.13, also identical to the Model Rule comment,55 the court further
noted that “the clear purpose of the entity rule was to enhance the corporate
lawyer’s ability to represent the best interests of the corporation without
automatically having the additional and potentially conflicting burden of
representing the corporation’s constituents.”56 Under this reasoning, even if
the organizing lawyer had previously represented the individual physicians
during the period of incorporation, the court would have been justifiably
skeptical of any claim that such representation continued once MRIGM
became a legal entity. As a result, in the absence of evidence of
postincorporation contact sufficient to establish the physicians as something
more than mere constituents in their dealings with MRIGM’s lawyer, the
court was clearly correct in holding that they were not current clients of the
plaintiffs’ lawyer or his law firm.57
So far, the court’s holding is straightforward and noncontroversial. But
the court turned then to the physicians’ argument that, if not current clients,
then at least they were former clients because they were individually
represented when the lawyer formed MRIGM for the benefit of all twentyeight physicians.58 The court summarily rejected this argument, relying
solely on its conclusion that the rationale underlying Rule 1.13 applied not
only to existing organizations but to a lawyer retained to organize an entity:
If a person who retains a lawyer for the purpose of organizing an entity is
considered the client . . . then any subsequent representation of the
corporate entity by the very lawyer who incorporated the entity would
automatically result in dual representation.
This automatic dual
representation, however, is the very situation the entity rule was designed
to protect corporate lawyers against.59

The court then adopted the following guideline:
[W]here (1) a person retains a lawyer for the purpose of organizing an entity
and (2) the lawyer’s involvement with that person is directly related to that
incorporation and (3) such entity is eventually incorporated, the entity rule
applies retroactively such that the lawyer’s pre-incorporation involvement
with the person is deemed to be representation of the entity, not the
person.60

In addition, the court stated that this standard would also apply to the
application of Rule 1.6—the confidentiality rule.61 In other words, “it is the

54. Id. at 66–67.
55. Id. at 67.
56. Id.
57. This was not how the court reasoned with respect to the physicians’ claim that they
were current clients. Rather, the court found that the defendants were never clients of the
organizing lawyer because of the retroactive status of the entity. Id. at 66.
58. Id. at 67–68.
59. Id. at 67.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id.
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corporate entity, not the retroactive constituent, that holds the privilege,”
again citing a comment to Rule 1.13.62
The defendant physicians attempted to produce evidence that the
organizing lawyer represented them as individuals, including the lawyer’s
affidavit stating that he was contacted “to assist a group of physicians in
Milwaukee in organizing an entity to own and operate one or more magnetic
resonance imaging (‘MRI’) facilities.”63 The court held that “[t]his evidence
overwhelmingly supports the proposition that the purpose of [the lawyer’s]
pre-incorporation involvement was to provide advice with respect to
organizing an entity and that [his] involvement was directly related to the
incorporation.”64 Because MRIGM was eventually incorporated, the
retroactivity rule applied.65
As for additional evidence that the physicians had filled out questionnaires
provided to them by the organizing lawyer that inquired “as to the physicians’
personal finances and their involvement in pending litigation,” the court held
that, because MRIGM was the client—not the physicians—and because the
communications were directly related to the purpose of organizing MRIGM,
the physicians could not claim the privilege of confidentiality.66
There are many weaknesses in the Jesse opinion. For example, once the
court rejected the physicians’ claim that they were current clients, there was
apparently no need to adopt the “retroactivity” rule because, even if the
physicians were former clients, they could only succeed in their
disqualification motion if they could establish that the current lawsuit was
substantially related to the subject matter of the former representation, and
that did not appear to be the case.67 Nevertheless, the court did announce its
adoption of a “retroactivity” rule; that rule has since been cited by other
courts68 and other authorities,69 and undoubtedly it will be considered by
62. Id. The court cited the comment to the Wisconsin version of Rule 1.13, which states
that “[w]hen one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the
organization’s lawyer in that person’s organizational capacity, the communication is protected
by Rule 1.6.” Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 20:1.13 cmt. 2); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (using the same language).
63. Jesse, 485 N.W.2d at 68.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 67–69.
66. Id. at 68–69.
67. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 73–74 (2003).
68. See, e.g., Manion v. Nagin, 394 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (8th Cir. 2005) (accepting the
Jesse rule but finding that it did not apply to the facts of the case at bar); McKinney v.
McMeans, 147 F. Supp. 2d 898, 901 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (citing Jesse as support for finding
that a lawyer did not represent a prospective shareholder).
69. See, e.g., Colorado Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm. Op. 68 (2011); SUSAN R. MARTYN &
LAWRENCE J. FOX, THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING ORGANIZATIONS 24–25 (2009); J. S. Nelson,
The Corporate Conspiracy Vacuum, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 296–98 (2015); Alec Rothrock,
Entity Formation: Defining the Client and the Duty of Confidentiality, COLO. LAW., July 2005,
at 77, 78 (2005); Thomas E. Rutledge & Phuc H. Lu, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished:
Pitfalls for Counsel to a Business Organization About to Be Governed by a New Law, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 755, 768 n.66 (2007); Tremblay, supra note 3, at 299–300; Note, supra note
46, at 695–96.

1710

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

future courts determining client identity in situations involving entity
formation, for either disqualification or liability purposes.70
For our purposes, Jesse’s major weakness is the court’s sole reliance on
the underlying rationale of Rule 1.13’s “entity rule,” which is to avoid
automatic dual representation (of entity and constituent) and its resulting
possibility of disabling conflicts of interest. This rationale makes sense when
a lawyer is retained by a fully formed entity to act on the entity’s behalf; the
lawyer is bound to act in the best interests of the entity, as determined by its
duly authorized constituents, without having to worry about the individual
and potentially conflicting interests of multiple constituents.71 But if the
individuals who retain a lawyer for the purpose of organizing the entity are
considered the clients of a lawyer, that does not mean, as the Jesse court says,
that “any subsequent representation of the corporate entity by the very lawyer
who incorporated the entity would automatically result in dual
representation.”72 To avoid dual representation of both the (existing) entity
and one or more constituents, all that is required is for the organizing lawyer
to clarify that, once the entity comes into being, the lawyer will become the
entity’s lawyer only and will cease representing the constituents as
individuals. Indeed, if it is contemplated from the start that the organizing
lawyer will become the entity’s lawyer, then the limited nature of the
lawyer’s initial representation of the founders can and should be made clear
at the time of the lawyer’s retention.
In addition, there are problems inherent in the retroactive nature of the
“entity” representation adopted in Jesse. The Jesse court conceded that, at
the time the lawyer is forming the entity, the lawyer is representing the
founding individuals; indeed, the opinion is clear that there will be no
retroactive substitution of the entity as client unless and until the entity comes
into being.73 But what if it does not? For example, what if the lawyer’s
negligence results in the failure of the entity to attain legal status? Surely the
individual founders should have a viable legal malpractice claim against the
lawyer if they can establish the requisite damages. Alternately, what if the
entity is never formed because of disputes between the founders, and one of
them subsequently alleges that the breakdown was attributable to the lawyer
having favored the interests of one them over the other? Surely the lawyer
should be subject to either a legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty
lawsuit by the complaining founder. In addition, the lawyer should also be
subject to disqualification if he or she seeks to represent the favored founder
in a lawsuit between the two former joint clients. Given that the lawyer
70. As Jesse itself illustrates, client identity is also relevant in determining who controls
the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality under both the attorney-client privilege and the
professional rule of confidentiality. Jesse, 485 N.W.2d at 67, 69.
71. Some have argued that the entity rule does not make sense, even for existing entities,
in internal disputes in closely held corporations and similar private entities. See, e.g.,
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a
Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 469 (1989); Simon, supra note 67, at 74.
72. Jesse, 485 N.W.2d at 67 (emphasis added).
73. Id.
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cannot know in advance whether the entity will be successfully formed, and
the lawyer will initially represent multiple individuals with potentially
conflicting interests, the lawyer should be bound to comply with the
applicable conflict of interest rules for the representation of multiple
individual clients.74
The prospective approach taken in the Arizona ethics opinion avoids the
problems inherent in Jesse’s retroactive approach to entity representation.
But before we examine the Arizona opinion, we should consider an opinion
of the Fifth Circuit, which adopted a retroactivity approach similar to, but
distinguishable from, Jesse’s. The Fifth Circuit decided that case, Hopper v.
Frank,75 two years after Jesse but did not cite the Wisconsin Supreme Court
opinion and relied on both different authority and a different rationale. As
such, it may offer a more attractive option for future courts to consider.
B. Hopper v. Frank
Plaintiffs Lewis Hopper and Joe Sanderson were the majority shareholders
of corporation Four-O, Inc.76 They decided to raise capital to finance a
television station through a limited partnership.77 In 1986, Hopper and FourO formed this limited partnership, Gulf Coast Television, Ltd., with the
assistance of a lawyer and his law firm.78 Hopper was an individual general
partner in Gulf Coast, and Four-O was the managing general partner.79 The
law firm was also retained to prepare public offering documents for limited
partnership interests; however, the attempted public offering was
unsuccessful.80 The plaintiffs sued the lawyer and the law firm for legal
malpractice, alleging that their delay in providing the public offering
documents was the reason the public offering was unsuccessful.81 The trial
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that there
was no attorney-client relationship between the plaintiffs and the law firm.82
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.83
Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis
with the state version of Model Rule 1.13 and its general provision that a
lawyer retained to represent an organization represents the organization itself
and not its constituents.84 It then cited ABA Formal Opinion 91-361, which
74. If, however, a default partnership exists when the founders approach the lawyer, and
the lawyer agrees to represent that partnership in its efforts to consider how to do business
going forward, then the lawyer will not have to comply with the rules regulating multiple
representation of individual clients. For a discussion of the problems associated with agreeing
to represent a default partnership, see infra Part V.
75. 16 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994).
76. Id. at 94.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 94–95.
83. Id. at 98.
84. Id. at 95 (noting that Mississippi had adopted Model Rule 1.13).
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had applied Model Rule 1.13 in determining when a partnership lawyer has
an attorney-client relationship with an individual partner.85 That opinion
analyzed a number of factors, including:
[W]hether the lawyer affirmatively assumed a duty of representation to the
individual partner, whether the partner was separately represented by other
counsel when the partnership was created or in connection with its affairs,
whether the lawyer had represented an individual partner before
undertaking to represent the partnership, and whether there was evidence
of reliance by the individual partner on the lawyer as his or her separate
counsel, or of the partner’s expectation of personal representation.86

More importantly, the Hopper court cited Formal Opinion 91-361 as
adopting the proposition that “a lawyer’s representation of a partnership may
preempt the prior representation of the partners as individuals.”87 The court
then noted that state corporation law “[s]imilarly” provides that “once a
corporation adopts a preformation contract that was made by one of its
incorporators with a view toward forming the entity, the corporation
preempts the incorporator’s status as a party to the contract and, thus,
assumes the incorporator’s liability.”88 After analyzing evidence consisting
primarily of correspondence between Hopper, Gulf Coast, and the law firm,
the court concluded that, “[a]t best, the documents before the district court
reflected that Hopper and Sanderson initially retained the Benesch Firm, and
that the firm thus represented them individually until the formation of the
partnership.”89 The court elaborated that “[o]nce the partnership was in
place . . . the summary judgment record reveals that the formation of Gulf
Coast preempted any prior relationship with Hopper and Sanderson with
respect to the delivery of the final public offering documents,” which, the
court found, was “a project that facially appears to relate only to the issuer,
Gulf Coast, who would receive and invest the funds raised in the public
offering.”90 Further, the court reasoned, even if an attorney-client
relationship existed preformation,
Gulf Coast’s acceptance of the benefits of the attorney-client relationship—
the final offering documents—and both parties’ agreement that Hopper and
Sanderson would not pay or be personally liable for any legal fees, make
clear that the attorney-client relationship with Gulf Coast preempted any
prior arguable relationship with Hopper and Sanderson.91

Like Jesse, Hopper is subject to criticism on the ground that its retroactive
“preemption” analysis may have been unnecessary to decide the case.
Although there was some correspondence between Hopper and the law firm

85. Id. at 95–96 (citing ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91361 (1991)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 97–98.
90. Id. at 98.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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about the anticipated public offering before Gulf Coast came into existence,92
Hopper and Sanderson apparently did not cite this correspondence, relying
solely on their affidavits that claimed, in a conclusory manner, that the firm
“performed legal services for [Hopper, Sanderson, and Gulf Coast].”93 As a
result, the court cited correspondence that apparently took place after Gulf
Coast was formed, which specifically indicated that the law firm would
prepare the final public offering documents for the issuer.94 And it was the
delay in delivering those documents, not any conduct that occurred prior to
the formation of Gulf Coast, that allegedly constituted legal malpractice.95
Accordingly, the court only needed to determine that, regardless of whether
Hopper and Sanderson were individual clients during the formation of the
limited partnership, once Gulf Coast came into existence, there was
insufficient evidence that the law firm continued to represent them
individually, in addition to representing Gulf Coast as an entity.96
But like Jesse, Hopper has also been cited as precedent for giving an entity
retroactive status as the sole client during the period of its formation.97 And
while the Jesse court had no legal precedent for the retroactivity rule it
adopted, the Hopper court cited not only an ABA ethics opinion but also a
solid body of state corporate law providing that once a corporation adopts a
preformation contract made by an incorporator, the corporation preempts the
incorporator’s status as a party to the contract.98
In my view, neither the ABA ethics opinion nor state business law provides
adequate support for the adoption of the retroactive “preemption” rule
applied in Hopper. First, the Hopper court almost certainly misinterpreted
Formal Opinion 91-361 as applying its “preemption” rule retroactively. The
primary purpose of the opinion was to clarify that Rule 1.13’s “entity rule”
applies to (existing) partnerships, as well as corporations, an application that
had been uncertain prior to the adoption of the Model Rules.99 According to
92. Id. at 94 (stating that evidence of correspondence dated 1985, before Gulf Coast
formed in 1986, was used primarily to claim the need for more discovery).
93. Id. at 97.
94. Id. It is not altogether clear that both letters were written after the formation of Gulf
Coast sometime in 1986, as the first letter is dated July 29, 1986, and the opinion does not
give the specific date when Gulf Coast became a limited partnership. Id. However, the court
does state that the letter “was from Hopper, in his capacity as a president of Four-O, Inc., the
managing general partner of Gulf Coast,” thereby implying that Gulf Coast had already been
formed. Id.
95. Id.
96. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING 18-32 to 18-35 (4th
ed. Supp. 2017) (holding that the law firm in Hopper may have represented limited partners
during formation of the partnership but had clearly transferred its client-lawyer relationship to
the entity by the time of the alleged misconduct).
97. See, e.g., Rutledge & Lu, supra note 69, at 768; cf. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 96, at
18-33 n. 32. Hopper is cited less frequently than Jesse, perhaps because it is more easily
interpreted as a narrow decision holding that the individuals had clearly transferred their
client-lawyer relationship to the entity when the misconduct occurred. HAZARD ET AL., supra
note 96, at 18-33 n. 32.
98. See Hopper, 16 F.3d at 95–96.
99. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991)
(stating that despite prior authorities treating a partnership as an “‘aggregate’ or group of
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the opinion, the entity concept rests in part on the notion that organizations
covered by this Rule are “separate jural entit[ies] having distinct rights and
duties and capable, among other things, of entering into contracts and either
bringing suit or being sued in [their] own name.”100 And because “case
authority and commentary support[ed] the treatment of partnerships as
entities separate from their owners,” the opinion concluded that “a
partnership is an organization within the meaning of Rule 1.13.”101
Having applied the “entity rule” to partnerships, the opinion then
addressed the question of when a partnership’s lawyer has an attorney-client
relationship with an individual partner.102 It concluded that, as with
corporations, the partnership lawyer does not represent an individual partner
“unless the specific circumstances show otherwise.”103 It then stated that
representing a partnership “does not necessarily preclude the representation
of individual partners in matters not clearly adverse to the interests of the
partnership, nor preempt such an individual representation previously
undertaken.”104 The most natural reading of that language is that, having
represented the individuals in forming the partnership, the partnership lawyer
may—but need not—cease representing the individuals after the partnership
is formed. In other words, preemption occurs when the lawyer replaces prior
individual representation with entity representation on a going-forward basis.
There is no reason to interpret the opinion’s preemption language as
imposing entity status retroactively on what was initially a representation of
one or more individual founders.
As for the second legal authority the Fifth Circuit cited, it is true that wellsettled corporate law provides that “once a corporation adopts a preformation
contract that was made by one of its incorporators with a view toward
forming the entity, the corporation preempts the incorporator’s status as a
party to the contract and, thus, assumes the incorporator’s liability.”105 And
this rule has been applied not only to corporate ratification of ordinary
business contracts but also to a corporation’s implied ratification of an
incorporator’s agreement to pay the organizing lawyer’s legal fees.106 But
permitting the corporation to assume an incorporator’s prior obligation to pay
a lawyer’s legal fees is not the same as making the corporation retroactively
the lawyer’s client or stripping the individual incorporator of that status. A
individuals, rather than as an entity,” for purpose of determining the substantive rights and
liabilities of the partners, the Model Rules drafters reject that concept in favor of the entity
theory in adopting Model Rule 1.13).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994). For authority on the law of corporate
adoption or ratification of preformation contracts, see generally 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5:4 (3d ed. 2018).
106. See, e.g., Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Paul, 609 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1980) (accepting
implied ratification when the municipal corporation accepted the benefits received, with full
knowledge of all the material facts, and failed to repudiate the contracts in a timely manner).

2020]

FORMING START-UP COMPANIES

1715

person paying a lawyer’s legal fees is not necessarily a client;107 therefore, a
corporation’s agreement to pay legal fees for work already done does not
make the corporation a client for purposes of that work. The corporate law
cited in Hopper is sound, but it should be limited to the corporation’s
assumption of legal obligations, without thereby attaining a status as a
retroactive client and certainly not one that displaces the incorporators as
individual clients in the formation of the corporation.
Finally, regardless of the strength or weakness of its cited precedent,
Hopper’s retroactivity rule suffers from the same practical problems raised
in the preceding critique of Jesse. But before rejecting the entity theory
entirely, we need to consider the possibility of an entity theory that is
prospective rather than retroactive. This is the position taken in Arizona
Ethics Opinion 02-06.108
III. PROSPECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF A YET-TO-BE-FORMED ENTITY:
ARIZONA ETHICS OPINION 02-06
In 2002, the State Bar of Arizona issued an ethics opinion advising that
“[a] lawyer may form a business entity for various individuals and be counsel
only for the yet-to-be-formed entity, if appropriate disclosures and consents
occur.”109 In the alternative, the lawyer may represent each of the
incorporators, also with appropriate disclosures.110 The opinion further
provided that the incorporators need to ratify the corporate action, nunc pro
tunc, once the entity is formed.111
In its initial determination that a lawyer can “represent an entity that does
not yet exist,” the state bar relied on: (1) a comment to the Arizona version
of Rule 1.13 that, like the Model Rule, states that the rule applies to
“unincorporated associations”;112 (2) state corporate law that, like the state
law cited in Hopper, provides that a newly formed corporation may ratify
preincorporation acts of the corporation and become retroactively liable;113
and (3) the decision in Jesse.114
As for the next question—whether a lawyer can represent “only the yet-tobe-formed entity and not the constituents”—the Arizona State Bar relied on

107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (regulating
when a lawyer may accept compensation for representing a client from a third person).
108. See State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Because the Arizona opinion requires ratification once the entity is formed, one
commentator views the opinion as failing to address the client identity question if the entity is
never formed. Jett Hanna, Entity Formation: Who Is the Client?, TEX. LAW. INS. EXCHANGE,
https://www.tlie.org/article/entity-formation-who-is-the-client/
[https://perma.cc/SA6YCTLN] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
112. State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 02-06; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.13 cmt. 1.
113. State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 02-06.
114. Id.
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the reasonable expectations of the individuals,115 a test that has evolved as a
common-law approach to deciding general questions concerning the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship.116 Applying this test, if the lawyer
is to avoid the inadvertent representation of the individual founders as a result
of misunderstandings, the lawyer should clarify that the lawyer does not
represent the constituents individually but only the yet-to-be-formed
entity.117
Finally, the state bar enumerated the disclosures a lawyer should make to
the incorporating constituents “to obtain their informed consent to the limited
representation of the entity.”118 Required disclosures include specifying to
the individuals that their communications will be conveyed to the other
decision makers and are not confidential as to the entity.119
Surely a prospective approach is better than a retroactive approach, if only
because it ensures that the founders are aware from the outset of their legal
status as nonclients.120 But even this more forthright option has its
weaknesses.
Consider the most significant aspect of the opinion: its initial conclusion
that a lawyer can represent an entity that has yet to be formed.121 This
conclusion is reached without much analysis. Like Hopper, the opinion
partly relies on state corporate law allowing a corporation to ratify
preformation contracts made by the incorporators.122 Indeed, the opinion
goes further than Hopper by explicitly stating that the incorporators will
subsequently “need to ratify this corporate action, nunc pro tunc, once the
entity is formed.”123 But the opinion does not address who the client is if the
corporation is not formed124 or if the incorporators neglect to cause the
corporation to ratify the preformation agreement.125 In any event, as
115. Id. (“Who a lawyer represents depends upon the reasonable perceptions of those who
have consulted with the lawyer.”).
116. See, e.g., Ingrid A. Minott, Note, The Attorney-Client Relationship: Exploring the
Unintended Consequences of Inadvertent Formation, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 269, 283–84
(2009).
117. State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 02-06.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Note, supra note 46, at 688–89 (advocating for a “reasonable constituent’s
expectation approach,” which “encourages attorneys to make pre-representation disclosures
to constituents that help ensure that all parties—attorney, constituent, and entity—have
common and consistent expectations concerning client identity”).
121. See State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 02-06.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See Hanna, supra note 111. An Arizona corporate practice treatise claims that “dicta”
in the Arizona ethics opinion wrongly interpreted professional responsibility law to require
subsequent corporate ratification, unaware that the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers provided for entity status in that situation without relying on either the “fiction of
ratification” or the “principles of corporate law.” 6 ARIZONA CORPORATE PRACTICE § 2:7
(Terence W. Thompson et al. eds., 2019). For a discussion of the applicable Restatement
comment, see infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
125. State corporate law may not require express ratification; it may be sufficient if the
corporation accepts the benefit of a preformation contract. See, e.g., Arctic Slope Native Ass’n
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previously discussed, state corporate law offers weak support for substituting
the corporation for the incorporators as the lawyer’s sole client when the
corporation is being formed. Nor is Jesse strong support given that, as
previously discussed, the decision is itself poorly reasoned. Additionally, the
Arizona opinion failed to note or distinguish the purely retroactive aspect of
Jesse, which did not require either preformation disclosures to the founders
or subsequent ratification by the corporation.
The most persuasive authority cited in the opinion is the Rule 1.13
comment, which clearly says that “[t]he duties defined in this Comment
apply equally to unincorporated associations.”126 But that comment also
begins by stating that “an organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot
act except through its . . . constituents.”127 This is perhaps why ABA Formal
Opinion 91-361 suggested limiting the Rule’s application to organizations
with a separate jural status, such as partnership.128 A subsequent ABA ethics
opinion took a broader approach, concluding that trade associations may be
entity clients, regardless of whether the trade association is recognized as a
“separate jural entity”;129 however, it did so with no analysis or discussion
of the circumstances under which other sorts of associations would qualify
as an entity client under Rule 1.13.130 Trade associations are typically
“formal organizations with established chains of command,”131 so perhaps
some level of formality is required.
To what extent can or should the term “unincorporated association” be
extended to include more “loose-knit” groups?132 A comment to the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is ambiguous. On the
one hand, it refers to “unincorporated associations (such as trade associations
and labor unions)” as but one example of “formally constituted
organizations” entitled to entity status,133 thereby suggesting a relatively
narrow interpretation of the term “unincorporated association.” On the other
v. Paul, 609 P.2d 32, 34 (Alaska 1980) (noting the incorporated borough “ratified” a lawyer’s
contracts with constituent communities by accepting benefits performed, with full knowledge
of material facts and without repudiating the contract in a timely manner).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
127. Id. r. 1.13 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. For a court decision agreeing with
this narrow interpretation, see generally Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. City of Atlantic
City, 624 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993), which applies Rule 1.13 to business trusts
because such trusts constitute separate legal entities under state law and cites numerous
authorities recognizing other unincorporated associations with separate legal status as entity
clients.
129. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-365 (1992).
130. Id.
131. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 96, at 18-16.
132. See id. at 18-16 to 18-18 (arguing that Rule 1.13 should be extended to include looseknit groups, including a group “formed primarily for the very purpose of retaining counsel,”
but indicating no existing authority for that proposition); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (stating that organizations
include informal entities such as a social club or informal group that has established an
investment pool); id. § 96 reporter’s note to cmt. c (citing no authority other than the Hazard
and Hodes treatise).
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. c.
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hand, the comment also says that “[a]n organization client may also be an
informal entity such as a social club or an informal group that has established
an investment pool,”134 thereby supporting the more expansive interpretation
endorsed by the Arizona ethics opinion.
The importance of the
Restatement’s reference to informal groups is weakened, however, by the
fact that the reporter’s note cites no legal authority for treating such groups
as organizational clients.135 Given the lack of clear precedent,136 whether
informal groups such as a group of founders should have organizational client
status remains an open question.
This brings us to the ultimate question of whether there are sufficient
policy considerations to justify granting prospective entity status to informal
groups of individuals seeking to form a business entity.
IV. SHOULD COURTS PERMIT LAWYERS TO CHOOSE TO REPRESENT A YETTO-BE-FORMED ENTITY?
An initial stumbling block to granting client status to a yet-to-be-formed
entity is the assumption that substantive law, such as the law of corporations
or partnerships, must control. If a corporation comes into existence only
when the articles of incorporation have been filed with the requisite
agency,137 then how is it possible for a lawyer to represent “the corporation”
prior to that time? Even after Jesse, Hopper, and Arizona Ethics Opinion 0206, some commentators continue to look to substantive law to provide the
obvious answer to this question—it is not possible.138
134. Id.
135. The only authority cited in the reporter’s note to Restatement section 96, comment c
is a professional responsibility treatise coauthored by the then executive director of the
American Law Institute, Geoffrey Hazard, which had stated its support for giving entity status
to such informal groups. Id. § 96 reporter’s note to cmt. c. That treatise continues to take that
position, although it does not itself cite any legal authority for doing so. Indeed, it cites both
the Model Rules and the Restatement as applying organizational status not only to
corporations but to “labor unions, unincorporated associations, governmental units, and other
formal organizations with established chains of command.” HAZARD ET AL., supra note 96, at
18-16. It then argues that “any set of two or more persons engaged in more or less concerted
activity could be regarded as an informal partnership or joint venture.” Id. (emphasis added).
Paul Tremblay cites the Hazard and Hodes treatise as possibly authorizing the representation
of informal community groups as entities, albeit only after a “forming up” process similar to
that described by FitzGibbon. Paul J. Tremblay, Counseling Community Groups, 17 CLINICAL
L. REV. 389, 421–37 (2010). Interestingly, Tremblay did not apply that theory to lawyers
forming start-up companies, where he continued to view the representation as one of
individual representation. See id. at 429–30 (describing a lawyer engaged in a limited
representation of three individual organizers as “agents and fiduciaries” of the rest of the
group).
136. See Tremblay, supra note 135, at 422 (“The authorities are not at all clear regarding
the legal status, within the attorney-client relationship, of a loosely-structured group.”).
137. See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002).
138. See, e.g., John M. Cunningham, The Professional Responsibilities of Lawyers Who
Represent Multiple Clients in LLC Formations, CUNNINGHAM-SEMINARS.COM, https://
web.archive.org/web/20030323224824/http://www.cunningham-seminars.com/articles/
item10.htm [https://perma.cc/769Y-P4V7] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“Clearly, the LLC
itself cannot be the client, since it does not yet exist.”). Tremblay, while acknowledging the
result in cases like Jesse, nevertheless argues that substantive law limits the choices available
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One commentator addresses this issue head on, persuasively arguing that
professional responsibility law is its own distinct field and that what
constitutes an “entity” or “organization” under corporate law or partnership
law (or tax law or environmental law) can differ from what constitutes an
“entity” or “organization” under professional responsibility law.139 Surely
this is correct; however, we still need to decide whether, and under what
circumstances, professional responsibility law should grant entity status to
informal groups such as founders seeking to form an entity.
To answer this question, we should begin by returning to the rationale
underlying the entity rule adopted in Model Rule 1.13. According to
FitzGibbon, who was discussing corporations, the lawyer is obligated to take
instruction in accordance with “whatever [the corporation’s] shareholders,
directors, and officers have caused it to direct within their powers and in
compliance with the stipulated formalities.”140 In doing so, the lawyer need
not “inform its constituents separately or seek their instructions or consent
even when acting to their disadvantage,”141 and the reason for that is that,
although “their interests may differ . . . they have freely chosen to join them,
and their judgments that a mutual subordination of goals will benefit all is
entitled to respect.”142 Indeed, “by embrac[ing] documents such as articles
of incorporation and by-laws which establish who speaks for whom and
when, they have provided the lawyer with a means of knowing how to act for
all of them.”143
This reasoning led FitzGibbon to conclude that entity representation is
appropriate, even when there is no formal entity, so long as “the individuals
have ‘formed themselves up’ with some degree of definiteness into a unit
which functions along agreed-upon lines.”144 He then explained what he
meant by proposing to amend Rule 1.13 to define an “organization” as
including
an association which is governed by articles of organization, by-laws or a
similar charter which specifies a division of authority and establishes
procedures for its exercise, and which is entered into voluntarily by
competent parties informed or having fair opportunity to become informed,
as to the nature of the association.145

How formal must this “similar charter” be, and what must the individuals
know (or have an opportunity to know) as to the nature of the association?

to the organizing lawyer. See Tremblay, supra note 3, at 275 (“It is not an answer to assert
that the lawyer should simply decide, along with his client, which designation they prefer. If
the participants are not partners, and if the default substantive doctrine would not by operation
of law deem their enterprise as a partnership, the lawyer may not have the authority to declare
that he will treat the group as partners.”).
139. See ARIZONA CORPORATE PRACTICE, supra note 124, § 2.5.
140. FITZGIBBON, supra note 14, at 8.
141. Id. at 10.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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According to a current professional responsibility treatise that supports
granting entity status to informal, “loosely-knit” groups, the group members
must have agreed to act as a unit and to reach collective decisions, and there
must be a formal organization with an “established chain of command.”146
In some situations, sophisticated business persons may have already
created such a “charter” before they approach a lawyer to assist them in
formalizing the informal agreements they have reached on their own.147 But
what if the individuals are not sophisticated in business matters and are
looking to the lawyer to assist them in addressing such issues as choice of
entity, allocation of ownership voting, and exit strategies? Surely many—
perhaps most—founders have little awareness of these matters and want their
lawyer to play the role of “initiator, planner and advisor.”148 Founders rarely
come to the lawyer with a fully fleshed-out business plan, and even when
they have already agreed on some aspects, they may reasonably expect that
the lawyer will discuss that plan with them and reexamine their conclusions
when it makes sense to do so.149
Consider the initial party planners hypothetical advanced at the start of this
Article. What would it take for them to “form themselves up” sufficiently to
warrant entity status as the lawyer’s client? Must they have already come to
a consensus as to how decisions will be made on the critical issues they will
address, including allocating ownership share and voting rights? And if they
have agreed that decisions will be made by majority vote and that each has
an equal vote, does it matter that they may be unaware of the extent to which
a majority can take unfair advantage of the minority? Or that it may be unfair
to grant each founder an equal vote if the founders are making substantially
different contributions to the entity? Or that, by agreeing to entity status
under a “charter” instructing the lawyer to take direction from anything other
than a consensus of all founders, they have agreed that the lawyer need not
146. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 96, at 18-16 to 18-17; see also Simon, supra note 67, at 86
(arguing that whether the client should be treated as an entity should depend less on matters
of formality and more on whether the relations in question have sufficient structure to
constitute a framework of dealing—parties who have not organized formally may have
developed an authority structure and sense of common goals sufficient to permit a distinction
between organizational and individual interests); Tremblay, supra note 135, at 426–28
(arguing that the three requisites for treating an informal group as an entity are that group
members must see themselves as group; the members of the group must be identifiable; and a
clear decision-making structure must exist). But see Tremblay, supra note 135, at 428
(discussing scholarship and practice around community lawyering, in which lawyers routinely
represent community groups in the absence of any decision-making structure).
147. In Buehler v. Sbardellati, two real estate investors decided to form a limited
partnership without the involvement of a lawyer. 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 106 (Ct. App. 1995).
They agreed on a purchase price for the property and arranged for financing. Id. at 107. The
investors sent a lawyer the paperwork on the transaction, including a contract of sale signed
by both. Id. Although the lawyer had some concerns regarding the structure of the partnership,
the investors told him that they did not want him to make decisions regarding the partnership
agreement. Id. The court rejected a subsequent legal malpractice action by one of the partners
on the ground that the investors had “already formed an enterprise” and that they understood
that the lawyer was to represent the partnership and not the individual partners. Id. at 111.
148. Mitchell, supra note 71, at 481.
149. Id. at 482.
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obtain the consent of, or even consult with, an individual founder, even when
drafting provisions that will substantially prejudice the interests of that
founder? And if the lawyer must fully disclose the ramifications of whatever
“charter” the founders have adopted, or will adopt in order to obtain
preformation entity status, then isn’t this similar to the type of disclosures the
lawyer must make when representing them jointly as individual clients?150
If so, then what is to be gained by granting them entity status?
Given the difficulty of determining whether and how professional
responsibility law should grant entity status to a yet-to-be-formed entity, and
the nature of the disclosures that a lawyer must make to each of the individual
constituents-to-be, courts should be reluctant to take this approach unless the
benefits of doing so outweigh the possible harms.
It is unclear what these benefits are. Once a “charter” exists, it may be
easier for the lawyer to take instruction from the duly authorized decision
makers without considering any potential conflict with individual
constituents.151 And the lawyer may also benefit from the ability to continue
representing the entity, once formed, in subsequent disputes with a
founder.152 Even so, some risk remains that individual constituents will rely
on the lawyer to protect their interests or at least inform them of the potential
disadvantages of choosing one entity-formation plan over another. And if
the lawyer advises one or more of them as to how a particular plan will affect
their interests, then the danger persists that, under the “reasonable
expectations” approach to client identity, a court will subsequently find that
the lawyer inadvertently entered into a lawyer-client relationship with one or
more of the individual founders.153 If so, the lawyer is more likely to be
found liable in a legal malpractice or breach fiduciary duty lawsuit or to be
disqualified when attempting to represent the subsequently formed entity in
a dispute with an initial founder.

150. And who is the lawyer’s client if and when the lawyer counsels them in “forming
themselves up” to the point where the group is entitled to entity status? Are the individual
founders prospective clients during that period of counseling?
151. See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationships in
Representing Limited Liability Companies and Other Unincorporated Associations and Their
Partners or Members, 25 STETSON L. REV. 389, 391 (1995) (noting that a lawyer representing
more than one organizer is “subject to an especially delicate set of ethical and legal liability
rules”).
152. See Simon, supra note 67, at 64 (contending that lawyers’ insistence that founders
agree that the lawyer represents the corporation and not the individual founders “seems to
serve little purpose other than to preserve their ability to align themselves against the founders
should a dispute arise after the outside investment”).
153. See, e.g., Manion v. Nagin, 394 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the application
of Jesse’s retroactive entity representation approach when a lawyer advised a founder that, as
the preferred stock owner, the founder could maintain control of the corporation and could not
be fired from his role as the corporation’s executive director); see also Hanna, supra note 111
(raising the practical issue of how to avoid giving legal advice to constituents when forming
an entity, including answering such questions as: “What is my potential liability under the
entity alternatives?”; “What are the tax implications?”; and “What are my options if I want to
withdraw from the entity?”).
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It is even less clear how the founders, either collectively or individually,
will benefit from the entity approach. Not much attention has been paid to
this question.154 The Harvard Law Review note endorses the entity approach
on the ground that it accords with the “reasonable expectations” of the
founders,155 but it is doubtful that this is so,156 particularly if the founders are
not experienced in entity representation and have not yet been fully informed
of the ramifications of this approach. Community groups like informal
tenants’ associations or neighborhood groups may see a value in acting
collectively toward a shared goal,157 but it is hard to understand what these
groups have in common with a group of founders coming to a lawyer to help
them decide precisely how they, as individuals, will organize themselves into
a formal entity.
FitzGibbon identified the founders’ desire to avoid the unnecessary
expense and possible disharmony of having separate lawyers for each.158 But
that goal is now more easily met by having a single lawyer represent them
jointly as individual clients. With informed consent, founders can limit the
lawyer’s role to assisting them in reaching consensus on the various aspects
of a business plan, giving them the information they need to negotiate among
themselves, without the lawyer being obligated to consider and advise each
individual founder where his or her best interests lie. The founders may also
consent to share information among themselves as well as with the
subsequently formed entity and to the lawyer’s representation of the entity,
once formed, in a subsequent dispute with an individual founder who will
cease being a client once the entity is formed. Such advance waivers are not
always enforceable, but there may be even greater risk to the founders under
the entity approach, including the risk that the lawyer may not be held
accountable for negligence in forming the entity or for favoring one founder
over another in resolving all of the issues raised in forming the details of the
business plan.
In light of all these concerns—both theoretical and practical—courts
should reject the possibility of entity representation of a yet-to-be-formed
entity in favor of representation of one or more of the multiple founders.
154. The Hazard and Hodes treatise proposal was apparently motivated by a desire to avoid
the implications of the aggregate settlement rule and to permit mass plaintiffs to agree to
accept an aggregate settlement offer by a previously agreed-upon majority or supermajority
vote. See Simon, supra note 67, at 111–14. It remains controversial even for that limited
purpose. See Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in
Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 180 (1999).
155. Note, supra note 46, at 703 (contending that, absent evidence to the contrary, such as
where the lawyer has a long-standing relationship with one of the founders, the “reasonable
expectation” of three hypothetical restauranteurs, who have decided to run a pizza parlor
together before retaining counsel, “must be one of ‘enterprise’ representation”).
156. See Simon, supra note 67, at 74 (assuming the Jesse court believed that “individuals
seeking incorporation expect and desire to be dealt with on a more formal basis” and then
criticizing this assumption, at least for smaller groups of founders, by finding that “the
overwhelmingly salient reasons for small business incorporation concern dealings with
outsiders” and not their internal relationships).
157. See Tremblay, supra note 135, at 426.
158. See generally FITZGIBBON, supra note 14.
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V. ENTITY REPRESENTATION OF DEFAULT PARTNERSHIPS
In some circumstances, individuals who have already begun the process of
developing a business will become partners in what Tremblay calls a
“partnership by operation of law”159 or what I call a “default partnership.”160
Indeed, such a partnership may exist in many of the situations described in
Part IV, in which the founders have agreed to act as a unit and to reach
collective decisions.161
Because default partnerships are legal entities, they qualify for entity client
status under Model Rule 1.13.162 Tremblay assumes that when this occurs,
the lawyer will inevitably be representing the partnership entity and not the
individual partners, but he does not explain why this is so. Conceding that
individual representation is always a choice, he nevertheless summarily
concludes that this “leaves the enterprise itself (the partnership) without
counsel, and any conflicts arising from partnership duties and benefits will
not have been sorted out at this early stage of the representation.”163 True,
representing the partners individually leaves the partnership with
representation, but it is unclear why this matters. And if the lawyer is going
to represent the partners individually, then surely the lawyer must identify
and address any conflicts among them, just as in joint representation in the
absence of a default partnership. There may be slight differences because of
fiduciary duties the partners owe to one another,164 but there is no obvious

159. See Tremblay, supra note 3, at 271, 304–06.
160. Tremblay finds a partnership by operation of law through what he refers to as the
“default substantive doctrine” that decides whether participants are partners in the absence of
an express partnership agreements. See id. at 274–76. As long as “[f]our elements . . . [are]
present,” specifically “(1) two or more persons; (2) associated; (3) to carry on a business for
profit; . . . (4) as co-owners,” the default law of partnerships applies. Id. at 276–77.
161. See supra Part IV. According to Tremblay, it may be likely that “most startups
seeking legal advice will either qualify as partnerships or as sole proprietorships that have
employees.” Id. at 278–79. Nevertheless, groups whose business ideas are “manifestly
‘inchoate’” will not qualify as partnerships (i.e., when the product has yet to be developed,
“[t]here have been virtually no capital investment, and there is nothing yet to own
collectively.”) Id. My colleague Jim Wheaton has told me that he disagrees with Tremblay’s
restrictive view of default partnerships and believes them to be far more common than
Tremblay concedes. As a result, Jim informs me that the Boston University Startup Law
Clinic typically enters into a formal retention agreement with “the partnership” as an entity,
prior to the filing of an LLC or corporate formation document and completion of the formal
organization of an entity.
162. As my colleague Jim Wheaton further informs me, however, the moment of “legal
incorporation” is not always an auspicious time to recognize the entity as a functioning client:
entities may be incorporated by a lawyer without any prior or even simultaneous creation of
other formal documents, such as articles of incorporation or even appointment of permanent
directors, and may continue to exist in that nonfunctional status for a considerable period of
time. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Relations with Management and Individual Financial Interests,
33 BUS. LAW. 1227, 1235 (1978) (describing the technical formation of a corporation without
a functioning board elected by owners, noting that the corporation here is “not intended to
function as a real entity until the financing is completed and closed,” and questioning who the
entity is (other than the promotor) to whom the lawyer’s allegiance is due).
163. See Tremblay, supra note 3, at 275.
164. See id. at 280.
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reason why these issues cannot adequately be addressed under a joint
representation model.
There are difficulties with a lawyer choosing to represent the default
partnership as an entity client. Conceptually, the problem is that the entity
itself does not appear to have any “interest” of its own in developing a more
formal plan for the business organization. Rather, as with situations lacking
a default partnership, the important interests are those of the individual
partners deciding how to organize themselves going forward. When an entity
has no interests separate from the interests of the individual constituents,
courts have been quick to “pierce the corporate veil” and find individual
representation, even when the organization is fully formed.165 This situation
most commonly arises with intra-entity disagreements, such as differences
between majority and minority owners.
Practical problems exist as well. For example, whose consent is necessary
to decide whether the lawyer will represent the entity or the individual
partners? Default partners typically do not know that they have formed a
partnership and have not agreed to any decision-making procedures. The
lawyer would need to explain the common law of default partnerships, as
well as the difference between individual and entity representation.166
Tremblay argues that, although there is a responsibility to “inform” the
partners, there is no need “to obtain any consent from them as a condition of
proceeding.”167 But this assumes that there are duly authorized constituents
who can direct the lawyer. In the absence of a partnership agreement, any
single partner can bind the partnership to a transaction in the “ordinary course
of the partnership business,”168 and disagreements among the partners with
respect to such transactions are decided by majority vote.169 But retaining
an attorney to assist the partnership in deciding how to formally
operationalize its business, including making changes to the entity’s
structure, is likely outside the ordinary course of business170 and would
therefore need the consent of all of the partners.171 Moreover, once the
lawyer is retained, a decision to change the structure of the entity in a manner
that has a potential adverse effect on the rights of the individual partners is
also outside the ordinary course of business and requires the consent of all of
165. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 69, at 291–92 (explaining that “courts have been willing
to pierce the single entity of corporate clients to recognize that an attorney’s true clients may
be the constituent parts of a larger corporate client and that covering the constituents under
the umbrella of a single entity misunderstands the true interests and incentives of the parties
involved”); Simon, supra note 67, at 67–69.
166. See Tremblay, supra note 3, at 308.
167. Id.
168. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 4.02[A] (Christine Hurt et al. eds., 2d
ed. Supp. 2018).
169. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
170. A decision to change the structure from a partnership to a corporation is outside the
scope of ordinary business; incorporation makes liquidation more difficult and changes the
partners’ financial rights. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 168,
§ 4.03[C][6]. Entity representation for the purpose of considering a formal change in entity
structure similarly has a potential adverse effect on the rights of the individual partners.
171. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j).
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the partners.172 Given this decision-making procedure, it is difficult to
imagine what advantage there is, to either the partnership or the individual
partners, of choosing to make the entity the client rather than the individual
partners.173
Perhaps at the initial meeting with the lawyer, all the partners could agree
to a decision-making structure other than consensus—for example,
authorizing a majority of the partners or a committee of partners to decide
whether to retain the lawyer on behalf of the entity and how the business
should be formally organized going forward. But what is the lawyer’s role
in assisting the partners to agree on a decision-making structure? Wouldn’t
the lawyer need to explain the advantages and disadvantages of the various
alternatives? And who is the lawyer’s client for purposes of this counseling
session? Is it the entity or is it the individuals? This type of counseling is
virtually identical to counseling an informal group that is “forming up” to
become an entity client, which Tremblay concedes involves representation
of the individuals involved.
CONCLUSION
When a lawyer is approached by multiple individuals seeking to form an
entity for the purpose of conducting a business, it is important for the lawyer
to clarify who it is that the lawyer will be representing. Founders often do
not want to retain more than one lawyer. As a result, lawyers usually
understand that they must decide whether they can ethically represent all of
the founders in a joint representation. If they consult court decisions and
secondary authorities, they may learn that it is possible, although uncertain,
that they may choose to prospectively represent an entity-to-be or that once
the entity is formed, entity representation may be imposed retroactively,
thereby stripping the individual founders of their status as clients, including
the right to sue the lawyer for malfeasance or to control the confidentiality of
their communications with the lawyer.
One purpose of this Article has been to explore both the validity and
desirability of providing some form of entity client status to a group of
individuals who have not yet formed a business organization. Neither the
retroactive nor the prospective approach to such preformation entity status
has any solid precedent to recommend it. Moreover, there appears to be no
strong policy rationale for affording such entity status in most cases.
Therefore, this Article concludes that courts that have yet to address the issue
should insist that the lawyer represent one or more of the individual founders,
172. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 168, § 4.03[C][6].
173. As with informal groups that may not yet be entity clients, it is the lawyer, not the
individuals, who appears to benefit most from granting the group entity status, through the
prospect of limiting liability to the individuals and avoiding subsequent disqualification. One
of the potential advantages of entity representation is the ability to continue to represent the
entity in a subsequent dispute with an individual constituent. This is clearly a benefit to the
entity, as well as to the lawyer, but this result is probably achievable in joint representation if
the partners give their informed consent to the lawyer continuing to represent the entity in any
such subsequent disputes.
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except when they have already formed what substantive law recognizes as a
default partnership. If, however, a court chooses to recognize some form of
preformation entity status, the prospective approach is clearly superior to the
retroactive approach taken in Jesse and Hopper.
When a default partnership has been formed, lawyers may choose to
represent the legally recognized entity. However, there are both conceptual
and practical difficulties in choosing to represent the default partnership
itself, as opposed to the individual partners. Conceptually, the partnership
appears to have no interest in determining how the individual partners will
do business going forward, and, as a practical matter, it is unclear how the
partnership will make all of the necessary decisions regarding choice of
(future) entity and allocation of ownership and control. As a result, this
Article urges lawyers to choose to represent one or more of the individual
founders, even when some form of entity representation is at least
theoretically permissible.
What is most important, of course, is that lawyers approached by founders
seeking to form an entity address the client identity question explicitly, with
full knowledge of both their legal options and the types of disclosures they
will need to make to the individuals with whom they will be working. These
disclosures should include the advantages and disadvantages of each type of
representation, and it should be the individuals who ultimately decide
whether they are satisfied with the type of representation the lawyer is
offering.

